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In sum, the challenges of teaching interpretive methods
have been met by these professors with a mixture of pragma-
tism, reflexivity, and innovation. And it can be argued that
their efforts enrich their departments. Just as theorists of de-
liberative democracy argue that citizens can learn the most by
listening intently to those with whom they disagree, so, too,
inclusion of interpretive methods in graduate methods cur-
ricula can contribute to the vitality of a department’s research
life—engendering debate in its graduate seminars and depart-
mental colloquia. At a minimum students can learn that there is
no need to fear their “methodological others.”
Notes
1 Thanks to the QMMR section for originally sponsoring this
roundtable at the 2008 APSA conference in Boston and to newsletter
editor Gary Goertz for encouraging the contributors to formalize
their remarks for this symposium.  Contributors’ syllabi are available
by emailing the authors or at the CQRM website hosted at the Max-
well School:  http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/cqrm/
syllabi.html.
2 Although Kubik reports working on a new stand-alone course on
interpretivism, it is likely that such courses are still relatively rare in
the discipline. For an exception, see Lisa Weeden’s quarter-length
course, Interpretive Methods in the Social Sciences, at the Univer-
sity of Chicago. As described in the course catalog, “This course is
designed to provide students with an introduction to interpretive
methods in the social sciences. Students will learn to ‘read’ texts and
images while also becoming familiar with contemporary thinking about
interpretation, narrative, ethnography, and social construction. Among
the methods we shall explore are: semiotics, hermeneutics, ordinary
language theory, and discourse analysis.” Often, stand-alone courses
first become available under special topics numbers; see, e.g., a 2009
offering by Ido Oren at the University of Florida, Interpretive Ap-
proaches to Political Science. Oren’s syllabus is available through the
CQRM website address in note 1.
3 For example, as Robert Adcock explains, graduate students at his
institution must take either an advanced statistics course or the re-
search design course he describes in his essay.





Interpretivist scholars have carefully documented the mini-
mal, at best, presence that interpretive philosophical perspec-
tives and empirical methods have had in political science meth-
ods texts and curricula (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2002;
Schwartz-Shea 2003). What are we to make of this absence? Is
there a problem to be rectified here? Or an allocation decision
justifiable in light of limited pedagogical time and resources?
Given the profusion of philosophical perspectives and meth-
ods for accessing, generating, and analyzing data found in the
social sciences as a whole, some absences are unavoidable in
any single discipline. Thus, the fact of the relative absence of
interpretivism in the methods training of political science gradu-
ate students cannot alone support arguments for (or against)
giving it more room.1
I expect readers of this newsletter differ, perhaps even
strongly, regarding the imperative (or lack thereof) to expand
exposure to interpretivism. Moreover, these differences are, I
suspect, tied up with alternative assumptions about how gradu-
ate students would respond if interpretivism were given more
room in methods training. One potential assumption is that
greater exposure would lead more students to use interpretive
perspectives or methods in their research. Alternatively, in-
creased exposure might be expected to produce more confu-
sion than conversions. The “conversion” assumption is prob-
ably more common among advocates of greater attention to
interpretivism, and the “confusion” assumption among skep-
tics.2 A third possibility would be a “recognition” assumption
that increasing exposure may make graduate students more
likely to see interpretive research as falling within the disci-
plinary parameters of political science, without necessarily
making them more likely to undertake it themselves. The latter
assumption initially motivated me to experiment with giving
interpretivism some room in my methods teaching. But, as I
explore below, my experiences have subsequently led me to
rethink that initial assumption.
My goal in this piece is to promote treating these kinds of
assumptions not as the sacred hopes (or fears) of sects fight-
ing for the souls of students, but as tentative hypotheses.
Evaluating them requires introducing some students to inter-
pretive perspectives and methods, and reflecting upon the re-
sults. Methods instructors comfortable enough with interpretiv-
ism to give it room in their teaching are, however, usually fa-
vorably predisposed toward it. To counteract confirmation bias,
those of us who make room for interpretivism must be espe-
cially attentive to the possibility of minimal or even negative
outcomes. A self-critical frankness is essential if our reflec-
tions on our experiences are to be received by disciplinary
colleagues as imbued not with methodological partisanship,
but with pedagogical pragmatism. A pragmatic approach to-
ward making room for interpretivism must reflexively seek out,
and critically adapt in light of, the practical lessons of peda-
gogical experiments, whether those experiments turn out as
initially hoped or not.
What Kind of Methods Course do I Teach to Whom?
There is no single recipe for giving interpretivism more
room in methods training. Efforts could involve anything from
adding an interpretive reading or two to an existing syllabus,
to designing a full course, or even a multi-course curriculum,
exploring interpretivism in its rich variety. My own effort has
been limited. I have added interpretive readings to an existing
graduate methods course while taking key parameters of the
course as fixed. This newsletter’s sophisticated readers will be
better judges than I of which aspects of my effort, and the
practical lessons I draw from it, might transfer to their own
pedagogical contexts. But for readers to make such judgments
it is necessary that I spell out some details regarding the kind
of course I have been teaching, in what broader curricular set-
ting, and to whom.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.940662
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ments—something akin to canaries in a goldmine—to explore
student reactions to varied aspects of interpretivism. I sought
to gauge reactions both during seminar discussions, and via
end-of-semester ratings of readings.3 My interpretation of
these reactions then informed syllabus revisions for my next
iteration teaching PSc 209: I trimmed two of the four entry
points listed above (1 and 3), while expanding attention to the
other two (2 and 4).4
In the four sections below, I discuss, for each entry point
in turn, the readings I assigned, student reactions, and my
subsequent syllabus revisions. It would be disingenuous to
present this process as if I were a dispassionate experimenter
coolly observing reactions. I went into the course with rather
well-developed priors regarding the strengths or weaknesses
of alternative formulations of interpretivism (Adcock 2003). I
also had assumptions regarding how students would respond
to various aspects of interpretive philosophy and methods. If
my subsequent syllabus revisions are one register of the re-
sults of my pedagogical experimentation, another is the updat-
ing of my own beliefs. I include below some commentary on
this more personal intellectual dimension because pragmatism
involves more than practical experimenting and adaptation; it
also involves being reflexive about the role that the subjectiv-
ity of the scientist/scholar plays in these processes.
Entry Point #1: Epistemology and Ontology
Contemporary interpretivists claim the status of an au-
tonomous third position within a tripartite division of the ter-
rain of methodology and methods that includes also quantita-
tive and qualitative positions (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006:
xv–xiv). The claim relies, first and foremost, on the argument
that interpretivists share a distinctive epistemological and on-
tological stance which sets them apart from a diffuse “positiv-
ism,” seen as the philosophical common ground of quantita-
tive, and also most qualitative, political scientists. This argu-
ment was (and remains) my least favorite entry point to
interpretivism (see Adcock 2009).Yet philosophical abstinence
did not appear plausible either, because leading currents in
recent methodological conversations—such as wide embrace
of the ideal of “shared standards” (Adcock and Collier 2001;
Brady and Collier 2004) among quantitative and qualitative
scholars—do rely on epistemological premises questioned by
many interpretivists.
My initial syllabus included two readings chosen to spot-
light these issues. I selected the sixth edition of Neuman’s
Social Research Methods (2006) as a text largely because of
its material on epistemology and ontology. Neuman identifies
three major longstanding philosophical traditions in social sci-
ence—positivist, interpretive, and critical—and surveys their
positions across a range of epistemological and ontological
issues. He also introduces feminism and postmodernism as
more recently developed stances that may inform empirical
social science. Neuman’s discussion is a textbook example of
the pros and cons of textbooks. It is accessible and concisely
summed up in a helpful table (2006: 105). But to pull this off
nuances are eliminated. As a more advanced reading a little
later in the class, I assigned “What would an adequate philoso-
I teach a semester-long graduate course entitled “System-
atic Inquiry and Research Design” (PSc 209) to students who
are nearly all pursuing a political science PhD. PSc 209 com-
bines a short philosophy of science component with more
extended readings on research design, and culminates with
students writing and critiquing draft research proposals. It is
part of my department’s methods sequence, which begins with
a course introducing statistical thinking and tools. All PhD
students take that course (or have taken its equivalent else-
where), and they then complete their methods requirement ei-
ther with an additional semester of statistical training, or by
taking PSc 209.
The curricular setting of PSc 209 has two consequences
for the abilities and interests of students. First, they have (or
are acquiring) some familiarity with basic descriptive and infer-
ential statistics. This has notable payoffs. For example, it helps
students to engage with nuanced arguments about the con-
ceptions of causation statistical techniques draw upon (on
this topic I assign Abbott 1998 and Goldthorpe 2001). Second,
students often take PSc 209 in lieu of a further statistical course
if they plan to pursue primarily qualitative dissertation research.
Many students thus come to the class looking quite specifi-
cally for guidance in qualitative methods. Some students are,
however, designing quantitative research, and many are inter-
ested in multi-method approaches. In terms of subfield distri-
bution, international relations is the major field of the largest
number of students, followed by comparative politics, and lastly
American politics.
What Aspects of Interpretivism to Include?
My effort to make room for interpretivism is only one, and
not the most important, pedagogical goal shaping the content
of my PSc 209 syllabus. I thus have, at most, a few weeks of
readings to play with, and can introduce only a taste of the
philosophical perspectives and empirical methods of access-
ing, generating, and analyzing data that might be labeled inter-
pretive. One response to these limits would be to focus the
readings and explore in some depth a specific way of framing
interpretivism (for example, the framing in Adcock 2003). But I
opted instead to experiment with a more diverse set of read-
ings.
The starting point for my pragmatic approach was to scat-
ter readings reflecting various ways of approaching interpret-
ivism throughout the semester. I did not use any kind of sam-
pling frame in selecting readings, but in retrospect they may be
summed up as offering at least two readings for each of four
entry points to interpretivism:
(1) Interpretivism as a general epistemological and/or onto-
logical stance;
(2) Interpretivism as a stance specifically centered on ques-
tions of explanation in social science;
(3) Interpretivism as research emphasizing “reflexivity”;
(4) Interpretivism as field research methods that seek un-
derstanding of others through intensive interaction in day-
to-day settings.
I approached my readings as a series of practical experi-
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phy of social science look like?” by Fay and Moon (1977).
They contrast traditions of “naturalism” and “humanism,” and
then argue that a social science capable of “critique” must
transcend this dichotomy. Fay and Moon here use slightly
different terminology to engage the same three traditions as
Neuman, but they advance a philosophical argument between
traditions, rather than a textbook survey.
I assumed that some of my students would be attracted to
one or another of these anti-positivist philosophical traditions,
and some confused by them. I hoped, in turn, that the attracted
students would spark a class discussion which, by differenti-
ating alternative anti-positivist stances and debating them,
would help clarify philosophical issues for them and their class-
mates.5 But I was entirely mistaken. In the class sessions for
which the Neumann and Fay and Moon readings were as-
signed, students did not raise the alternatives to positivism
themselves, and when I pushed this material into one discus-
sion, they reacted by identifying with positivism. Indeed, the
main effect of my interjection was to spur students to argue
that alternative positions fail to meet key norms of political
science, such as objectivity. In sum, rather than loosening
positivist tendencies in my students’ developing sense of dis-
ciplinary identity, presenting epistemological and ontological
challenges only provided an “other” which reinforced those
tendencies. Exposure led to rejection, rather than to recogni-
tion, of the claim of other views to be potential philosophical
foundations for empirical research in political science.
In light of this experience, I dropped this first entry point
to interpretivism from the next iteration of PSc 209. My deci-
sion was made easier by the discovery that other readings
were effective at getting students to debate shared standards.
The reading that worked best here was Mahoney and Goertz’s
“A Tale of Two Cultures” (2006), which highlights differences
in how quantitative and qualitative scholars tend to conceive
of explanation and causation, and then traces the ramifications
of these differences through a wide array of research norms
and practices. Mahoney and Goertz synthesized specific con-
trasts that were tangibly familiar to students from readings in
their substantive classes. The pedagogical take-home for me
was that exploring how any one standard—such as “causal
inference”—is actually pursued in familiar political science ex-
amples is a more effective spur to discussion of whether we
have (or should have) “shared standards” than staging a philo-
sophical “battle royale” at the level of epistemology and on-
tology.
Entry Point #2: What Makes for a Good Explanation?
My second entry point to interpretivism, while still philo-
sophical in character, was pitched at the level of a specific
question: what makes for a good explanation in social science?
I incorporated interpretive views on this question within a
several-week unit on explanation and causality. I devoted most
of one session to the classic debate regarding the relation
between understanding and explanation, assigning Charles
Taylor’s “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” (1971), along-
side readings selected to engage subfield interests in Ameri-
can politics (Soss 2006), comparative politics (Schwartz 1984;
Kurzman 2004), and international relations (Wendt 1998).
This second entry point to interpretivism was the most
successful in raising sympathetic student engagement. In broad
outline, our class discussion tracked a path that I expected.
Students were receptive to the argument that gaining under-
standing is a core task of social science, so long as under-
standing was framed in Weberian fashion as an aid, rather than
alternative, to explanation. I was, however, surprised by stu-
dents’ reactions to two readings. First, put bluntly, they hated
Taylor’s famous essay. They found it too abstract, perhaps in
part because they lacked familiarity with its examples from po-
litical science debates of the 1960s. Second, the students were
excited by Wendt’s argument that there is more than one kind
of explanation. These reactions inverted my own priors, which
ranked Taylor as the best reading, and underrated Wendt’s
concept of “constitutive explanation” as a mode of explana-
tion distinguished from “causal explanation.”
In light of these reactions, I subsequently revised my
syllabus in three ways. First, I cut Taylor’s article since it just
does not speak effectively to my graduate students. Second,
I reevaluated my view of Wendt’s distinction between causal
and constitutive explanations. I decided that, rather than a
confusing novelty, it links up nicely with the distinction be-
tween causal and unification theories of explanation presented
in the philosophy of science text I assign (Godfrey-Smith 2003:
Chap. 13). It is, moreover, useful for unpacking the “interpretist”
approach of Schwartz (1984) as being explanatory in a specifi-
cally constitutive sense. Third, I added readings to explore
varieties of explanation far more fully. In particular, I chose
readings which, like Wendt, distinguish kinds of explanations,
but that draw distinctions along different lines: Roth (2004)
on “structural” vs. “situational” vs. “intentional” explana-
tions, and Abbott (2004) on “semantic” vs. “syntactic” vs.
“pragmatic” explanatory programs. Finally, to balance the split-
ting tendency of these readings, I added material from Elster’s
new Explaining Social Behavior arguing that all good social
science explanations share common features based on the
hypothetico-deductive method (2007: 15–20).
These syllabus shifts supplemented the classic issue I
began with—the relation of understanding to explanation in
social science—with questions about whether there are mul-
tiple varieties of explanation, and if so, whether there are inte-
grating standards relevant across them all. Raising these ad-
ditional questions remakes the old debate about understand-
ing as an aid or an alternative to explanation. The debate
becomes whether understanding is necessary to all species
of social science explanation (and thus offers a shared stan-
dard in light of which all explanations that do not incorporate
understanding fall short), or whether it is, instead, necessary
only for some kinds of explanation (and thus a distinguishing
feature of those kinds). My beliefs on these questions are
unsettled. But I hope teaching my methods class will con-
tinue to push along my thinking in the years ahead!
Entry Point #3: Reflexivity
It is common for interpretivists to emphasize the need for,
and benefits of, greater “reflexivity” in social science. Reflex-
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ivity involves scholars reflecting upon their own knowledge-
producing activities with the same tools and critical distance
they apply when analyzing the activities of others. This can
be done at an individual level, with researchers considering,
for example, how their personal identity characteristics influ-
ence their research activities and products. My initial PSc 209
syllabus included one reading chosen to introduce this per-
sonalized reflexivity (Shehata 2006). Reflexivity might, how-
ever, be pursued with more aggregate units of analysis: re-
search programs, subfields, disciplines, or even social sci-
ence writ large.
I selected three readings exemplifying reflexivity in its
more sociological and historical forms. First, I assigned Oren’s
(2006) argument that major changes in the way that American
political scientists conceptualize democracy have followed
shifts in America’s international relations, with “democracy”
reconceived to exclude nations that become America’s en-
emies and include its allies. A second reading emphasized the
interplay between the ebb and flow of current events and
intellectual shifts in political science, asking what this entails
for the kinds of “progress” that are (and are not) possible in
our discipline (Dryzek 1986). The third reading (Osborne and
Rose 1999) looked at the dynamic between social science and
society from the opposite direction, by asking whether social
science can produce novel social phenomena. In particular,
the reading argued that the creation of sampling techniques
remade not only social scientists’ knowledge of public opin-
ion, but ultimately the character of public opinion itself.
I was personally excited about these three reflexivity read-
ings because they spotlight the history of social science, which
is one of my own research areas. However, the readings fell
decidedly flat. In each week for which one was assigned, stu-
dents largely ignored it in favor of discussing other readings.
For example, I paired Oren’s article with Collier and Levitsky
(1997) work on conceptualizations of democracy, which ana-
lyzes a narrower period of political science usage and does
not attend to the international context Oren emphasizes. It
was the latter piece students engaged with, however, because
it delved in more detail into specific conceptual developments
in recent literature. When I flagged the contrasting approaches
of the pieces, my students argued that Oren’s historical ap-
proach did not offer the practical aid in clarifying conceptual
confusions and choices they face in their own research, which
they found in Collier and Levitsky’s work.
Taking account of such reactions, I have eliminated this
third entry point to interpretivism from my syllabus. The sole
exception is Dryzek (1986), which I retain as part of a philoso-
phy of science week on “progress.” A broader take-home of
this experience was to push me to think more carefully (and
humbly!) about the status of reflexive historical analyses of
social science. While all methods courses encourage students
to reflect upon the methods they use, I now incline to the view
that specifically historical and sociological forms of reflexiv-
ity are two among many substantive research specializations,
rather than methodological ideals for social scientists more
generally to try to live up to.
Entry Point #4: Intensive Interaction in Day-to-Day Settings
My fourth entry point to interpretivism focused on gath-
ering data through intensive in-person interaction with sub-
jects in their day-to-day settings. While such interaction is a
core part of ethnography, I wanted to emphasize that it is a
broader data-gathering method. So in selecting readings I
paired the anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s classic “Thick De-
scription” essay (1973) with readings from former APSA presi-
dent Richard Fenno (1977, 1990) about his participant obser-
vation of members of Congress in their home districts. A sec-
ond goal was to highlight the endeavor to grasp the perspec-
tive of subjects who interpret and act in the world using con-
cepts different from those of the academics studying them. To
this end I assigned Schaffer (2006) on interviewing ordinary
citizens of other societies in a way designed to elicit details
and nuances of what a concept like “democracy” means in
their language and political context. I also assigned a further
essay by Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View” (1979),
which reflects on the task of grasping the “experience-near”
concepts of subjects, but also contends that the ultimate goal
is to relate those concepts to the “experience-distant” con-
cepts of generalizing social science theory.
During class discussion of this day of readings, the dy-
namic of students identifying in contrast to an “other,” which
had surprised me with regard to my first entry point, was again
noticeable. The principal “other” here was Geertz and “eth-
nography” more generally, which my students saw as some-
thing anthropologists, as opposed to political scientists, do.
Some of this dynamic also developed in response to Fenno.
While recognizing his work as a classic in the American poli-
tics subfield, my students identified his method of participant
observation as marginal to more recent developments in that
subfield. They then debated whether it could be a viable method
today for young scholars of American politics anxious to be
seen as contributing to the cutting edge of the contemporary
subfield. Hence, while I had chosen my Geertz and Fenno read-
ings as accessible pieces that might provide interesting mod-
els, students referred to them in our discussion first and fore-
most as examples of what they believe they should not (or
cannot) do in their own research.
An illuminating contrast was, however, provided by the
very positive reaction of my students to Schaffer (2006). With
regard to endeavors to grasp the perspective of others, I ex-
pected students to prefer Geertz’s “From the Native’s Point of
View” since it suggests that understanding local perspectives
is not an end in itself, and that the social scientific goal in such
work is to connect local perspectives to generalizing theory.
But two points about the Schaffer piece won student apprecia-
tion. First, Schaffer presents his method as a mode of inter-
viewing. While in-depth field interviewing is a central part of
both ethnography and participant observation, about half of
my students singled out interviewing as something they plan
to do and want guidance in, even as they distanced them-
selves from labels such as “ethnography” or “participant ob-
servation.” Second, Schaffer’s piece presents a lengthy ex-
cerpt of an actual interview to illustrate his differentiation of
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types of questions and their role at different points in an inter-
view. It thus offered students a concrete sense of what in-
depth interviewing can involve, which turned out to be much
closer to what they were looking for than the more meta-reflec-
tions of Geertz’s essay.
In revisiting my syllabus in light of these reactions, I
dropped Geertz’s “Native’s Point of View” and turned inter-
viewing into a central topic. I added a PS symposium (Leech et
al. 2002) on elite interviewing with both overseas and domestic
examples. I also added a chapter (Walsh 2009) from the forth-
coming volume Political Ethnography edited by Edward
Schatz. Like Schaffer’s, Walsh’s piece offers students a tan-
gible connection to the in-person field research experience, in
her case by excerpting conversations of ordinary citizens of
Michigan. Finally I added selections from scholarly interviews
with Robert Bates and James Scott (Munck and Snyder 2007)
in which each talks about his field research overseas. My goal
here was both to show leading political scientists of very dif-
ferent methodological persuasions arguing that field research
is essential, and to give more concrete examples of the back-
and-forth dynamics of good interviewing.
Conclusion: Two Take-Home Lessons
Early in this contribution I suggested that instructors seek-
ing to pragmatically make room for interpretivism be self-criti-
cal about where they themselves are coming from, in order to
be as open as possible to learning from student reactions,
even, and indeed especially, reactions that cut against prior
beliefs. My first concluding lesson is that it is no less impor-
tant to reflect on where our students are coming from. Looking
back over the reactions reported above, I am constantly re-
minded that the bulk of my students were third-years, in the
middle of taking comprehensive exams, and anxious about for-
mulating a dissertation project that could engage faculty advi-
sors and, hopefully, in the longer term, political scientists else-
where. Having invested much time and effort in prior classes
and exam studying, students at this stage in a PhD program are
especially receptive to methods readings that connect to works
and debates they are already familiar with. This both makes a
reading more accessible and reassures students that the method
or perspective being presented is within the bounds of the
“political science” they are being socialized into. For any
scholar, faculty or student, our sense of what “political sci-
ence” is has been shaped by what we have read (or at least
read about), and third-year students have already read a lot!
Students at this stage are, moreover, also understandingly ea-
ger consumers of readings that give a concrete sense of, and
advice about, the practical realities of doing research.
My second concluding lesson concerns the results of
exposing students to novel perspectives or methods. Parti-
sans of interpretivism should be aware that increasing student
exposure is no sure route to greater disciplinary recognition,
let alone use, of interpretive perspectives and methods. Stu-
dents are busy people who allocate attention selectively. They
may skim the surface and not really engage interpretive read-
ings (especially if they are assigned plenty of other readings).
Alternatively, they may engage interpretivism, but do so via
criticism and identifying against it. My take-home point is cer-
tainly not that making room for interpretivism will always be
futile or outright counterproductive. But I want to advocate
the relative payoff of selectively focusing on interpretive read-
ings that address activities our students already expect to pur-
sue. They all plan to construct explanations, and many to con-
duct interviews of one sort of another. Interpretivists have
distinct viewpoints to offer regarding the standards for good
explanation in social sciences, and practical guidance to give
about methods—such as in-depth interviewing—that help meet
those standards. Interpretivism is, I would suggest, most likely
to win a receptive hearing among political science graduate
students, and the discipline more broadly, when it engages
matters of common and practical concern.
Notes
1 The political theory subfield is predominantly interpretive. Hence,
more precisely, the point in question is whether interpretivism should
be given more room in the methods training of graduate students
outside of political theory.
2 The flow from assumptions to arguments here is not automatic.
Advocates of greater exposure subscribing to a conversion assump-
tion also believe (or hope) that the consequences of conversion will
be positive for individual converts and, over the longer term, for the
discipline more broadly. Different assessment of consequences could,
however, reframe “conversion” as a “corruption,” either of individual
careers or the discipline.
3 At the end of the semester I gave students fresh copies of the
syllabus and had them put a + (or multiple ++’s for stronger reac-
tions) next to readings they would recommend for the next iteration
of PSc 209, and a – next to those they would not. I did not single out
interpretive readings for special attention in this process, but rather
encouraged students to rate any readings that stood out to them.
4 Student reactions informed changes to various aspects of my
syllabus, not just my interpretivism readings. Thus, for example, I
also dropped a unit on lab experiments in political science.
5 The tensions between “humanist” (aka “interpretive”) and “criti-
cal” philosophies deserve, I believe, just as much attention as the
disputes either of them has with “positivism.” Eliding these tensions
helps construct the appearance of a united “anti-positivist” position,
but that appearance is purchased at the price of philosophical confu-
sion.
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